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We will shed outdated management and acquisition practices, while 
adopting [emphasis added] American industries’ best practices. Our 
management structure and processes are not engraved in stone. (Secretary 
of Defense, 2018, pp. 18–19) 
This chapter introduces the topic of innovation adoption within Department of 
Defense (DoD) organizations. Specific attention is given to its applicability to the national 
defense strategy. Additionally, this chapter provides an overview of the purpose, 
methodology, and approach to analysis regarding the topic of innovation adoption within 
DoD organizations.  
A. WHAT IS INNOVATION ADOPTION? 
Innovation adoption is the process by which organizations integrate new ideas, 
concepts, methodologies, or technologies into their existing infrastructure.1 This 
infrastructure includes people, processes, facilities, and technologies. While innovations 
within the military and those occurring within the commercial sector may differ on several 
points, many of the underlying dynamics related to the adoption of innovation are shared. 
Understanding the nature of innovation in both kinds of organizations require observation 
of the process by which innovation is adopted, to include the challenges associated with 
integrating and implementing the innovation within organizations. 
1. Innovation Adoption within the Department of Defense 
DoD organizations seeking to adopt and diffuse innovations usually require some 
degree of structural and organizational changes. Additionally, innovations by themselves 
often provide little operational value until they are properly embedded in organizational 
and managerial practices, which themselves often need changes resulting from the 
innovation. Such a co-evolutionary process is not without challenges, including various 
individual, organizational and bureaucratic barriers to change and inertias. Augier, Dew, 
& Aten (personal communication, April 2015) discuss the challenges of inertia while 
                                                 
1 A definition is, for example, provided by Evans (2006). 
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attempting to adopt new practices within organizations. They argue that innovations are 
more successfully diffused when compatible with existing organizational values: “the 
relative advantage of an innovation, its simplicity (complexity), and its compatibility with 
established beliefs and preferences are the biggest predictors of how fast an innovation will 
diffuse in a population of individuals” (Augier et al., personal communication, April 2015). 
2. Relevance to National Defense
The topic of innovation is also central to national defense. The 2018 National 
Defense Strategy (NDS) leverages the term to describe such concepts as, “technological 
innovation,” “business innovation,” “organized for innovation,” and the “National Security 
Innovation Base” (Department of Defense [DoD], 2018). The successful adoption and 
integration of commercial innovations is a major theme of the 2018 NDS, for several 
reasons, including the need to expand the defense industrial base; and to adopt best 
practices from industry leaders. Attempts to incorporate commercial methodologies, 
concepts, and innovation theories within military organizations presents unique challenges 
which are deeply embedded within the conduct of warfare and the nature of innovation 
itself. Thus, the complexities involving the integrating and adoption of commercial 
innovations within defense organizations is a relevant topic of research.  
The ability of DoD organizations to adopt, innovate, and diffuse certain innovations 
has played a notable role in maintaining an advantageous national security posture for 
centuries (Murray, 1996;  Millet, 1996, p. 1); and innovation at both tactical and strategic 
levels are important for military organizations to adopt. Although innovation by its very 
nature can be very hard to predict and plan in detail (Augier & Hughes, personal 
communication, April 10, 2018), managing innovations and the adoption of them within 
military organizations will have relevancy to the tactical-edge of warfighting as well as be 
reflected in DoD’s operating concept and business practices.2 Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publication 1 states, “Success depends in large part on the ability to adapt—to proactively 
shape changing events to our advantage as well as to react quickly to constantly changing 
2 Implementation of adapting to innovation is not new; for instance, MCDP 1 or FMFM 1 both 
emphasize this point. 
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conditions” (Department of the Navy [DoN], 1997). The 2018 NDS also addresses the need 
for modernization and change: “Modernization is not defined solely by hardware; it 
requires change in the ways we organize [emphasis added] and employ forces” (DoD, 
2018).3 Hence, a challenge for both current and future military leaders will be integrating 
commercial innovations with (national security related) strategic ends; and further relating 
those ends to results across the domains of warfare. 
B. PURPOSE 
During the preparation of this thesis, I became increasingly aware of the complex 
array of challenges related to an organization’s capacity to adopt new ideas. For instance, 
integrating new ideas into existing organizations can tests one’s ability to careful esteem 
underlying values and acknowledge entrenched beliefs tightly held within the adopting 
institution. The innovator’s ability to account for existing organizational beliefs, values, 
and paradigms will influence their ability to effectively diffuse innovations over the long-
term. Andrew Marshall offers time-tested wisdom regarding the integration of new ideas 
within organizations: “Developing and gaining acceptance for a new framework of 
strategic analysis will not be easy. Changing people’s minds, or ways of thinking about 
problems, takes time” (Marshall, cited in Augier et al., personal communication, April 
2015). 
This research is designed to extend the discussion regarding DoD’s integration of 
innovations at the organizational level. Although it is impossible to dispel or address all 
arguments concerning innovation and its adoption within military organizations in one 
thesis, I attempt to address key issues surrounding the process of adoption and the unique 
barriers to this process within DoD organizations. The purpose of this research is to provide 
insights to the following research question: How can the adoption of innovative concepts, 
methodologies, and technologies be better understood and leveraged within DoD 
organizations?  




In order to address this question, I use both academic / scholarly writings as well 
as empirical data / cases. An initial literature review will be used to identify key relevant 
literature surrounding the challenges of innovation adoption within organizations. The 
review will also present further opportunities and challenges unique to DoD organizations. 
Observations made during the literature review will then be synthesized in order to extract 
key themes among the literature.  
D. APPROACH TO ANALYSIS  
Opportunities to adopt innovations exist at each level of warfare and within the 
variety of supporting establishments. This thesis will take occasion to address the adoption 
of innovations specifically within organizations supporting the various warfighting 
functions. Detailed attention will be given to organizations which have attempted to adopt 
innovative business practices related to acquisition and procurement. The analysis 
provided within Chapter IV analyzes the adoption of other transactions authority (OTA) 
within specific DoD agencies. Finally, I will draw upon this analysis to discuss some 
lessons learned and further extend the discussion of DoD’s integration of innovations at 
the organizational level. 
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter introduced the concept of innovation adoption and 
described the relevancy of innovation within the context of national defense. Additionally, 
this chapter outlined the purpose, methodology, and approach to analysis associated with 
this research. The following chapter will provide a review of literature surrounding the 
topic of innovation adoption within organizations.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Success no longer goes to the country that develops a new technology first, 
but rather to the one that better integrates [emphasis added] it and adapts 
[emphasis added] its way of fighting. (DOD, 2018) 
The previous chapter introduced the topic of innovation adoption within the context 
of defense organizations. This chapter opens a broader discussion of the topic and reviews 
literature relevant to the opportunities and challenges relevant to the adoption of innovation 
within organizations. Finally, my intended contribution to literature will be discussed.  
A. INNOVATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
1. Innovative Leaders 
Recognizing individual contributions to innovation is central to the discussion of 
innovation within organizations. Individuals exemplifying innovative leadership provide a 
starting place to discuss how innovation can be integrated into existing organizational 
paradigms. Examples abound within the DoD of individuals who introduced new concepts 
to the institution, including Victor Krulak; James Mattis; John Boyd; Al Gray, and others. 
Oftentimes, innovative shifts within organizational practices involve initial 
experimentations, but do not get embedded in the organization’s way of thinking before 
key leaders push and develop the ideas. For instance, as was the case with the maneuver 
warfare movement within the Marine Corps:   
For maneuver warfare to take its place as the Marine Corps’ organizational 
principle, several organizational factors needed to be in place. Central to 
maneuver warfare’s success was the role of Gray in pushing forward 
learning and experimentation, intellectual debate, reading and building 
loyalty in boot camp. (Augier & Guo, 2017, p. 142) 
Although innovative leaders will ensure that needed changes are continuously 
driven within our armed services, military organizations do not only have to rely on 
recruiting innovative talent, but can also seek to harness innovative thinking and learning 
within the organization (Roberts & King, 1996; Osborne, 2005).  
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2. Training Innovators 
The training and education of nation’s military has been a major theme of research 
and discussion since the early militia of the American colonies. According to J. M. Palmer, 
the initial considerations for adequate development of a well-suited military points to the 
importance of both an organized and adequately trained militia (Palmer, 1941). Andreski 
(1968) argued that the development and sustainment of a nation’s military is highly 
regulated through its ability to train and deploy its forces abroad: 
If the skills necessary for a warrior can be acquired and kept only by 
protracted and continuous training, military service tends to become 
professionalized. Normal economic activities cannot be reconciled with 
continuous military training except in the case of primitive hunters...if the 
wars are waged in distant regions–distant, that is to say, in relation to the 
development of the means of communication–the professionalization of the 
army will be fostered. (p. 34) 
Opportunities to think differently within military organizations usually begins 
within its training and education institutions. These institutions provide the basis for 
organizational learning as well as agreeable points of departure, when challenging the 
status quo is needed.4 Murray (1996) comments on the centrality of these institutions to 
innovative thinking during the interwar period:  
One of the important components in successful innovation in the interwar 
period had to do with the ability of officers to use their imaginations in 
examining potential innovations. The atmosphere that institutions of 
professional military education fostered was central to developing such 
imaginative powers and thus to success in innovation. (Murray, 1996, pp. 
317–318) 
Educating future military leaders to better understand the nature of innovation (as 
well as to become innovative in their thinking) is essential for our military organizations 
to be able to continue to adapt in the future. Continuously integrating the topic of 
innovation within military education as well as recognizing those who lead with innovation 
may help improve its application within DoD organizations. 
                                                 
4 Institutions include not only service schools, to include the Naval Postgraduate School, but also 
institutes espousing rigorous professional military education such as Marine Corps University, Air Force 
University, and the U.S. Naval War College. 
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B. INNOVATION AND THE ORGANIZATION 
While individuals “thinking differently” is an important place to start, Osborne 
(2005) discusses the importance of innovation residing within the fabric of the organization 
as opposed to individual innovativeness: “an over-emphasis on the individual to the 
exclusion of the organizational context risks the collapse of the innovation once that 
individual leaves the organization” (p. 171). 
Transitioning from individually-held innovations to ones ready to be integrated 
requires leaders who maintain a genuine awareness of interpersonal and group dynamics 
as well as very good understanding of how their organizations work. Augier and Hughes 
discuss the leadership challenges associated with transitioning organizations from 
individual to collaborative and integrated innovation:  
A problem arises when planners do not appreciate the necessary 
contribution of a few precious disruptive and innovative thinkers. But if 
innovators alone dominate, then there is no one to plan the development, 
implementation, and tactics to exploit an innovation, often in ways quite 
different from the original intent. Leaders must know how to recognize, 
nurture, and listen to innovative thinkers and suppress bureaucratic 
impediments to “thinking differently.” (Augier & Hughes, personal 
communication, April 10, 2018) 
Bardach (2008) argues that innovation within government organizations involve 
long developmental process, distinguishable subprocesses, and feedback mechanisms. 
According to Bardach (2008), government organizations seeking to become more 
innovation should look to expand their innovative capacity over rewarding innovative 
individuals. She explains that focusing on organization capacity helps build corporate 
virtue over individual virtue: “capacity also has the opposite virtue of consolidating under 
one rubric rather than varied components, such as individuals’ psychological 
dispositions...it permits us to ‘give credit,’ so to speak, for collaborative success that may 
not look much like collaborative behavior on the surface, such as quarrels and threats that 
serve the purpose of clearing the air and preparing the way or more productive work” 
(Bardach, 2008, p. 122). 
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C. NUANCES OF DOD INNOVATION AT THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
LEVEL 
An organization’s environment and operational context will naturally influence the 
various decisions and behaviors affecting its means and rate of innovation adoption. 
Military institutions, in particular, face unique challenges which can be specifically 
attributed to its operational context and environment. This section of the literature review 
will describe this environment in relation to the organization’s ability to adopt innovations. 
1. Environments of Innovation: Commercial Markets and Battlefields  
Soeters et al. (2010) distinguishes the military organization from other 
organizations which are directly influenced by commercial market dynamics:  
they differ from most organizations that have to prove their existence 
everyday in a market where their supply needs to meet a demand...But in 
the military the relation between supply and demand is indirect at best. The 
lack of a direct market and price mechanism tends to make military people 
more preoccupied with operations than with costs. Aside from a highly 
appreciated concern for casualties among their own personnel, military 
leaders do not have a natural interest in organizational efficiency. If worst 
comes to worst, they are deliberately ignorant in this respect. (pp. 3–4) 
According to Augier and Guo (2017), “military organizations compete on a 
significantly different level from business or non-profit organizations. Rather than trying 
to capture market share, military organizations seek to advance their nation’s strategic 
goals and to prevent the enemy from accomplishing its goals” (p. 130). 
Scholars have discussed both peace time and war time military innovations and 
their importance for national (Western) powers (Rosen, 1991; Murray & Millet, 1996).  
The operational environment in which innovations take place fundamentally change the 
way wars are fought. Rosen (1991), describes three changes caused by major military 
innovations:  
a change in one of the primary combat arms of a service in the way it fights 
or alternatively, as the creation of a new combat arm…a change in the 
concepts of operation of that combat arm… a change in the relation of that 
combat arm to other combat arms and a downgrading or abandoning of 
older concepts of operation and possibly of a formerly dominate weapon 
system. (pp. 7–8)  
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Even during peacetime operations, military organizations are regarding as being 
unique and distinct from other organizations. Soeters et al. (2010) uses an analogy of hot 
and cold to describe the differences and similarities: 
One deals with ‘cold’ peacetime and routine conditions, hence, resembling 
‘conventional’ organizations. The other operates in in ‘hot’ conditions, 
during crisis and peace operations or outright war. In the latter 
circumstances the military have the authority on behalf of the state to use 
violence and compel people to do things they would probably not do within 
the military’s actions and instructions...This authority makes the military 
and other ‘uniformed organizations’ exceptional. But even during 
peacetime conditions, the military is not just like any other organization. 
(Soeters et al., 2010, p. 1) 
Carter (2014) argues for a unique symmetry between military innovation and the 
battlefield. He discusses the necessity of institutionalizing innovation in order to quickly 
adapt lessons learned from war, while yet perceiving new innovative approaches to future 
combat operations: “it is crucial to make permanent the institutional innovations resulting 
from the hard-earned lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq, while the experiences are still fresh. 
Too many lives were lost in the early years of those wars because the Pentagon failed to 
keep up with a changing battlefield. Never again should it make the same mistake” (p. 
112).  
Consideration of an organization’s context is essential to understanding how it 
interacts with innovative ideas and people. Within military organizations, this context is 
both intuitively understood and explicitly stated in military doctrine, directives, and 
publication manuals. In large part, military organization understand their operating context 
to be one of warfare. The overarching paradigm which best describes this environment is 
the three levels of warfare. Understanding how this environment impacts our understanding 
of innovation is the goal of the next section of the review. 
2. Integrating Innovation at Various Levels of Warfare 
Successful integration of innovations relies on an understanding of existing 
organizational paradigms. Within military organizations, a prevailing paradigm which 
assists leaders in visualizing linkages between strategy and tactics are the three levels of 
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warfare (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2017). The levels of warfare provide a beginning 
framework for understanding the context in which military organizations operate and can 
be used as a starting point for discussing how innovation could potentially impact military 
strategy and tactics. Figure 1 illustrates the three-level framework applicable to joint 
operations.  
 
Figure 1.  Levels of war framework. Source: JCS (2017). 
Rosen (1991) distinguishes between major innovations affecting operations, and 
those more relevant to the tactical level, describing major innovations as “a change in the 
way individual weapons are applied to the target and environment in battle” (p. 8). Murray 
(1996) addresses the difficulty of assessing innovation at the strategic level of war: 
“Innovation takes place at all levels of war; perhaps the most difficult to understand are 
innovations that nations confront when major changes occur in the balance of power or the 
political framework within which war occurs” (p. 304). He continues to argue that 
understanding the strategic context of military operations are essential prerequisites to 
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military innovations: “the strategic arena, as well as political and military assessments of 
the strategic framework, is an essential prerequisite to successful innovation” (Murray, 
1996, p. 305). Millet also comments on the essentialness of understanding the strategic 
environment’s influence upon military innovation during the interwar period: “The 
strategic evolution of the interwar period–from the flirtation with collective security in the 
1920s to the hostile coalitions of 1939–influenced military innovation, perhaps more than 
any other factor” (Millett, 1996, p. 342). Rosen further affirms the importance of focusing 
innovations at the strategic levels of warfare:  
When military innovation is required in wartime, however, it is because an 
inappropriate strategic goal is being pursued, or because the relationship 
between military operations and that goal has been misunderstood...A new 
strategic goal must be selected and a new relationship between military 
operations and that goal must be defined...Until the strategic measure of 
effectiveness has been redefined, organizational learning relevant to 
innovation cannot take place. (Rosen, 1991, p. 35) 
Relating innovation to an organization’s existing paradigms can serve as a starting 
point to collectively discuss and understand its application. Discussion concerning how 
innovations ‘work’ within organizations however, will undoubtedly be characterized by 
examples of various outliers and misappropriations of a particular approach. This however, 
is to be expected within organizations whose operational environment is charged with 
unpredictability and complexity. 
3. Prevailing Paradigms and Complexities  
In addition to organizational structure and the presence of long-standing paradigms 
inherent to military organizations, there also exist multiple complexities which may slow 
the rate of innovation adoption. Bijlsma (2010) describes how complexities systemically 
plague military organizations: 
Military organizations are systems designed to cope with a high degree of 
uncertainty. They have to operate in very dynamic and high risks 
environments where a large part of the information is ambiguous, imperfect 
or false...they are characterized by interactive complexity and tight coupling 
of organizational activities. Interactive complexity refers to irreversibility 
of process and multiple, non-linear feedback loops. Tightly coupled 
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organizations have little slack; actions in one part of the systems directly 
influence other parts of the organization. (p. 228)  
Augier and Hughes also discuss the complexities inherent to military organizations 
attempting to employ innovation: 
Most innovations take place in organizations, or need organizations to 
effectuate new inventions. Organizations can help and encourage, but 
sometimes stifle, innovation. As organizations age and grow (and most 
military organizations are both quite large and old) They first develop 
routines, rules and structures to improve efficiencies and get things done, 
but then the rules and bureaucratic processes often take a life of their own 
and multiply, resulting in organizational calcification. (Augier & Hughes, 
personal communication, April 10, 2018) 
While it is possible for new technologies to simplify individual tasks, they may also 
be responsible for introducing greater complexities within military organizations. Shultz 
(2016) argues that innovative technologies often introduce new change and therefore tend 
to increase complexity within organizations. Without continuous and intentional 
transformation, Shultz argues, organizations embracing technological innovations could 
struggle to achieve repetitive success (Weick, 2000; Shultz, 2016). 
Innovations occurring within DoD organizations must not only be described and 
understood within the proper context, but must also encounter the acceptance of dominant 
groups. Farrell (1996) describes how dominant groups within the ranks of military 
organizations can persuade the rate of innovation adoption: 
Given that innovation is such a tall order, organisations have good reason 
to be slow to innovate. Moreover, those interests and beliefs which are 
dominant in an organisation are in a good position to remain so...The 
hierarchy of interests within organisations is also unlikely to change: 
dominant group interests become embedded in organisations and, from that 
dominant position, such groups are well placed to extend their networks into 
the policy environment to build coalitions in support of their interests. (p. 
124) 
The presence of dominant groups or hierarchal complexities within DoD 
organizations however, is not an excuse to avoid innovation or promote the acceptance of 
the status quo. The next section of the literature review identifies contributions intended to 
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deal with the complexities and uncertainties surrounding attempts to integrate innovations 
within DoD organizations. Key themes discovered during the review include,  
1. The ability to initiate strategic and organizational communication 
surrounding innovation and innovation initiatives 
2.  The observation of innovation adoption as an organizational process  
3. The ability to identify factors which contribute to the decline of a culture 
of innovation  
Given the barriers and challenges to adopting new ideas within organizations, 
scholars have developed ideas and perspectives for how to overcome them. Although 
several potential solutions exist, those mentioned above seemed to repeatedly emerge as 
central to the discussion of the DoD’s adoption of innovation, and are the final components 
of the literature review.  
D. COMMUNICATING INNOVATION 
1. Strategic Communication  
The discussion surround the DoD’s adoption of innovation begins with strategic-
level communication (Millett, 1996; Murray, 1996; Rosen, 1991). The influence of 
legislation and policy on defense practices cannot be underestimated when considering the 
adoption of new ideas and methodologies. Hamre (2016) discusses the importance of 
maintaining policy and legislation relevant to the DoD’s efforts to remain innovative in its 
approach to acquisitions and procurement: 
The problem is that the Packard Commission decapitated the department’s 
innovation ecosystem. This is not a critique of the people who have served 
as undersecretaries of acquisition. Each of them has heroically tried to be 
an innovator. But the Congress has handcuffed them to a legal framework 
that was (maybe) relevant in 1986 but is counterproductive in 2016. (para. 
11) 
Additionally, DoD organizations seeking to implement new ideas and innovative 
practices will often take cues from strategic-level guidance issued by senior leaders within 
the department. Joint Publication 3–0 affirms this notion in stating, “Military strategy, 
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derived from national policy and strategy and informed by doctrine, provides a framework 
for conducting operations” (JCS, 2017). Additionally, Sanders (2014), argues for the 
inclusions of clear and directive guidance from senior defense leaders for innovation 
metrics such as R&D spending: 
In the face of pressure from ongoing operations and budget constraints, 
strategic choices will not happen without top-level guidance. The next 
secretary should articulate a clear vision and lay the groundwork for future 
programmatic and policy decisions. He or she has broad authority to 
describe priorities, necessary sacrifices, and supporting policies. Clarity 
will aid not just those within DoD but also those in industry that regularly 
complain about the absence of clear signals as to where internal R&D 
spending should be directed. (p. 4) 
Within military organizations, innovation initiatives often extend from the guidance 
and influence of its leaders. The challenge henceforth is discovering how organizations can 
effectively disseminate this guidance. Leaders at the operational and tactical levels of 
defense organizations maintain the heaviest burden of group and interpersonal 
communication of innovations.  
2. Group and Interpersonal Communication  
Organizational leaders seeking to disseminate strategic-level initiatives must be 
willing to clarify their meanings in terms relevant to the organization’s mission. At the 
organizational-level of communication, middle managers (as opposed to senior 
executives), may pose the biggest communication challenge and have the least incentive to 
change. Gavetti, Giorgi, and Henderson (2005) discuss the challenges faced by Gorge M.C. 
Fisher, former CEO of Kodak, to overcome the “cognitive inertia” associated with this 
particular group:  
Fisher has been able to change the culture at the very top. But he hasn’t been 
able to change the huge mass of middle managers...Fisher, who was used to 
dissent and open discussion in Motorola…felt Kodak’s executives avoided 
confrontations and venerated authority…Fisher tried to introduce the 
Motorola-style of open discussion, but change was difficult. The razor-
blade culture of Kodak was so deeply ingrained that even disposable 
cameras had been considered almost sacrilegious. (p. 6) 
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Fisher’s struggle to effectively communicate new ideas to Kodak’s middle 
managers are not unfounded; however, innovations producing long-term effects must be 
transferred from individuals to groups. Okhuysen and Eisenhardt (2002) analyzed how 
individuals collaborate and interact in order to integrate personally-held knowledge into 
the larger organizational setting. Their study identifies effective group interactions that aid 
in transitioning individual knowledge to collective-level knowledge. Three specific 
interventions are suggested: information sharing, questioning others, and managing time 
(Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002, pp. 370–371).  
Giving attention to strategic-level and organizational communication helps 
emphasize the overall importance of innovation to an organization’s members, however 
communicating an approach to an adoptive process may prove more challenging. The next 
section of the literature review accentuates an adoptive process which captures common 
trends experienced by organizations attempting to adopt innovations. 
E. ADOPTING INNOVATIONS 
Rogers, most known for his research surrounding the diffusion of innovations 
among individuals, also addresses the innovation adoption within organizations through 
what is known as the Five Stages Model (Rogers, 1995, 2003). The Five Stages Model 
particular model, which supporting the adoption of innovation within organizations, 
identifies two broad activities (Rogers, 2003, p. 420): initiation and implementation. 
Rogers (2003) argues that the adoption of innovations within organizations is not 
completed once the organization has simply decided to adopt a particular innovation. 
Instead, the innovation must undergo and implementation process that serves to further 
embed and sustain the innovation over a longer period of time (Green, 1986; Rogers, 2003). 
The two broad activities of adoption (initiation and implementation) consist of stages 
which describe the adoption process: agenda-setting, matching, redefining/restructuring, 
clarifying, routinizing (Rogers, 2003, pp. 420–435). This section of the literature review 
will utilize the Five Stages Model to describe innovation adoption at the organizational-
level.  
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1. Agenda Setting 
Agenda-setting is the initial stage of the innovation adoption process. During this 
stage, an organization identifies and prioritizes its needs, and attempts to locate a relevant 
innovative solution. Rogers (2003) defines agenda-setting as “the way in which needs, 
problems, and issues bubble up through a system and are prioritized in a hierarchy for 
attention” (p. 422). The agenda-setting stage consist of two subprocesses:  
(1) Identifying a problem or performance gap 
(2) Locating a potential innovation to partially or wholly mitigate the problem 
or performance gap 
Agenda-setting is often difficult to achieve due to competing interests and differing views 
surrounding which problems are most important. According to agenda-setting theory, the 
media’s influence upon public opinion is a critical component to how senior government 
officials prioritize policy creation (Peake, 2001; Peake & Eshbaugh-Soha, 2008; Rutledge 
& Price, 2014).  
2. Matching  
Matching is the organization’s attempt to more closely align a potential innovation 
with the design of the organization. During this stage, organizations can test the 
innovation’s compatibility with its core operations and business processes (Goodman & 
Steckler, 1989; Rogers, 2003). If the innovation has been broadly applied in other 
organizational settings, the matching stage allows the adopting organization to uniquely 
“fit” and “test” the innovation with its current capabilities and processes (Rogers, 2003, p. 
423). The matching stage consist of two subprocesses: 
(1) Fitting  
(2) Testing  
Both fitting and testing allows the adopting organization to assess relevant benefits and 
problems associated with the potential innovation. The matching stage marks a transition 
within the organization’s initial courtship with an innovation to further stages which assist 
the organization in its implementation of the innovation. The results of this stage will help 
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the adopting organization reach a determination to reject the innovation or move on to the 
implementation phase. The next and final stages of the model represent actions taken by 
organizations to effectively implement innovation (Rogers, 2003). 
3. Restructuring and Redefining 
According to Rogers (2003) redefining/restructuring occurs when “the innovation 
is re-invented [emphasis added] so as to accommodate the organization’s needs and 
structure more closely, and when the organization’s structure is modified to fit with the 
innovation” (p. 424). During this stage, both innovations and organizations have an 
opportunity to mutually adapt prior to entering into the final two stages of adoption (Van 
de Ven, 1986; Rogers, 2003). The redefining/restructuring stage consist of two 
subprocesses: 
(1) Innovation re-invention 
(2) Organizational structure or process modification 
Redefining/restructuring can be further explained by considering the impact of beta-testing 
on innovations and organizations. For example, beta-testing a new enterprise planning 
system could provide insights to an organization as to how it could restructure its workflow. 
The same beta-test might also inform software developers of needed changes to the 
graphical user interface of the system (Boland, 2013; Jacques, 2014). According to Rogers 
(2003), organizations should seek to maximize the benefits of re-inventing the innovation 
and exploring modifications to the organization’s structure or process prior to allowing the 
innovation to become more routine and embedded (Rogers, 2003). 
4. Clarifying 
Organization’s completing the redefining/restructuring stage of adoption should not 
assume the innovation is clearly understood and accepted within the organization. 
According to Rogers (2003), clarification of new innovations occurs, “as the innovation is 
put into more widespread use in the organization (p. 427). Two actions are critical for 
organizations undergoing intentional clarification of innovations:  
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(1) Addressing questions of impact: According to Rogers, “When a new idea is 
first implemented in an organization, it has little meaning to the 
organization’s members and is surrounded by uncertainty. How does it 
work? What does it do? Who in the organization will be affected by it? 
Will it affect me? These are typical questions” (Rogers, 2003, p. 428).  
(2) Facilitating intentional discussions: According to Rogers, “As the people in 
an organization talk about the innovation, they gradually gain a common 
understanding of it. Thus, their meaning of the innovation is constructed 
over time” (Rogers, 2003, p. 428). 
Clarifying innovations which have gained traction within the organization is often 
overlooked due to its deceptive nature. Often, organization leaders assume that matching 
and redefining/restructuring activities are representative of acceptance (Rogers, 2003). 
Advancing an innovation onward to the routinization stage, without addressing questions 
of impact or facilitating intentional discussions, can result in unnecessary 
“misunderstands” or “side effects” (Rogers, 2003, p. 248)5 The next and final stage, 
routinization, can only effectively take place once clarifying questions have been 
adequately addressed. 
5. Routinizing
Innovations are considered to have reached the routinizing stage once they are able 
to be sustained without the use of special authorities or expertise (Rogers, 2003). 
Innovations reaching this stage of the adoption process are well integrated with other 
routine functions of the organization and are no longer consider to be foreign or separate 
(Rogers, 2003; Bertels, Howard-Grenville, & Pek,  2016). Routinized innovations, in some 
cases, are considered to have become institutionalized (Goodman & Steckler, 1989; Rogers 
2003). There are two primary indicators of having reached the routinization stage: 
5 Clarifying activities might include publically available memos, guidebooks, and whitepapers 
designed to provide a descriptive overview of the innovation. Such awareness campaigns can be separate 
from more prescriptive efforts to explains details of the innovation or routinize the innovation within the 
organization. 
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(1) The degree to which organizational members have participated in the 
implementation of the innovation 
(2) The the degree to which adopters have been able to modify the innovation 
to fit the organization’s realistic needs (re-invention)  
The participation of organizational members in the implementation and re-invention of 
innovations may also be indicative of the organization’s ability to sustain the innovation 
overtime. According to Rogers (2003), “When an organization’s members change an 
innovation as they adopt it, they begin to regard it as their own, and are more likely to 
continue it over time, even when the initial special resources are withdrawn or diminish” 
(p. 429). 
While a process illustrating how organizations adopt innovations does not explain 
every scenario, it can however, be used to better understand the elements involved in the 
adoption process. Furthermore, the implementations of innovation do not always equate to 
organizational success. The final section of the literature review addresses the rise and fall 
of the innovative culture at the RAND Corporation.  
F. INNOVATIVE AT RISK  
Process-driven solutions may not always satisfy the demands to successfully adopt 
innovations over long periods of time. In some cases, the solution may reside within the 
organization’s ability to prioritize and sustain an innovative culture. Innovative cultures 
are hard to describe and seemingly more difficult to sustain over long periods of time. 
Additionally, sustaining a particular culture within a single DoD organization may prove 
challenging due to an organization’s tempo and the turnover of key personnel. In other 
cases, however, difficulties to further innovative cultures may be stifled by the culture 
itself. Augier, March, and Marshall (2015) studied the rise and decline of the innovative 
culture at RAND and found that, “Self confidence, endurance, and growth produce 
numerous positive consequences for an organization; but for the most part, they undermine 
variety. Outliers and the conditions that produce them are not favored by their 
environments” (p. 1140).  
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The caution from Augier et al. to DoD organizations seeking to maintain an 
innovative culture is depicted by a thread of organizational successes and failures 
exemplified by DoD and commercial organizations alike (Lee, 2015). While no institution 
is exempt from the challenges associated with embracing innovations and an innovative 
culture, there does exists an array of lessons learned in order to educated and inform 
the next generation of innovators. Augier et al. (2015) offer three considerations 
for organizations seeking to maintain a culture of discovery (p. 1157): 
1. Independent Discovery: Independent and simultaneous generation of ideas
through the imagination of individuals. While this mode of discover is not
as responsive to others, it is heavily influenced by its organization
structure and work environment.
2. Combinatoric Discovery: Imaginative stimulation occurring through
interaction with others. An organization’s structure might discourage or
encourage such behavior.
3. A Culture of Discovery: Discovery, exploration, and imaginative thinking
is central to the organizational ethos. While the origins of organizational
culture are not explained, it includes interaction or collaboration;
consciousness of distinctiveness; and the formulation and spread of mythic
history.
The adoption of an innovative culture appears to be just as important as the adoption of 
innovation itself. Challenges beyond these two efforts exists as organizations attempt to 
maintain an innovative culture and mitigate its decline. The findings of Augier et al. (2015) 
accent the previous sections of the literature review by framing the lessons learned within 
the RAND Corporations in the context of individuals, groups, and culture. The following 
section will identify my contribution to the existing literature reviewed. 
G. SUMMARY AND CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTING LITERATURE 
This chapter reviewed existing literature regarding the topic of innovation adoption 
within DoD organizations. Specific attention was given to the adoption of innovation 
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within organizations, as opposed to individuals; and various decisions and behaviors 
affecting the DoD’s means and rate of innovation adoption.  
Given the apparent challenges within DoD to adopt innovations, three themes were 
extracted from the existing literature which identified how DoD can more effectively adopt 
innovation: 
1. The ability to initiate strategic and organizational communication 
surrounding innovation and innovation initiatives 
2.  The observation of innovation adoption as an organizational process  
3. The ability to identify factors which contribute to the decline of a culture 
of innovation 
The DoD is not new to the practice of adopting innovations, and as such, the 
following chapter will provide examples of short cases wherein the department has pursued 
such efforts. My contribution to the existing literature will be to provide an analysis, using 
the literature reviewed, of the DoD’s adoption of contracting framework used to construct 
innovative agreements with commercial organizations: other transactions authority (OTA).  
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III. EMPERICAL CASE STUDIES  
Innovation is usually a group effort, involving collaboration between 
visionaries and engineers, and that creativity comes from drawing on many 
sources. Only in storybooks do inventions come like a thunderbolt, or a 
lightbulb popping out of the head of a lone individual in a basement or garret 
or garage. (Isaacson, 2015, p. 85) 
The cases presented within this chapter are used to demonstrate the DoD’s adoption 
of other transaction authority. In order to better understand the conditions leading to DoD’s 
adoption of OTA, the inception of OTA within NASA has been included. The contents of 
the case will be analyzed in the following chapter in order to better understand how DoD 
can strengthen its efforts to adoption innovations.  
A. THE ORIGINS OF OTA AT NASA 
The phrase “other transactions” was first included in the Space Act of 1958 to 
afford NASA the ability to construct what would later be known as Space Act Agreements 
(SAAs).6 These agreements would be used to allow commercial companies to leverage 
NASA’s facilities and equipment during R&D activities supporting space launch and 
exploration efforts. The presidential administration of 1958 provided clear strategic 
guidance surrounding NASA’s establishment and its purpose. Innovation and speed 
quickly emerged as a common theme within the administration, as maintaining a 
technological edge was considered essential to a strong national defense posture (National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], 1966). 
The creation of both NASA and ARPA in 1958 represents U.S. efforts to prioritize 
the integration of commercial, scientific, and defense innovation. Central to the 
innovativeness of both NASA and DARPA has been their ability to construct creative R&D 
agreements in order to attract innovative commercial companies. Both organizations have 
historically leveraged unconventional means to acquire unique talent and exercise flexible 
                                                 
6 Originally 51 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20164, grants NASA this authority. Specifically, Section 20113(e) of 
the Space Act (NASA, 2014). 
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authorities in order to achieve breakthrough technologies (DARPA, 2016).7 In NASA’s 
case, OTA was used to construct flexible agreements with commercial organizations in a 
way unfamiliar to existing federal procurement statues. The Space Act’s initial author and 
first general counsel to NASA, Paul G. Dembling, explains the use of OTA terminology at 
the onset of NASA’s establishment: 
While it is common for Federal departments and agencies in their organic 
or authorizing statutes to be provided authority to enter into contracts, 
leases, and cooperative agreements, I wanted to assure that the organization 
met any contingency that might arise, and so I added the language for “other 
transactions.” The Space Act, for the first time, authorized an agency, 
NASA, to enter into “other transactions.” (Dembling, 2008, p. 211) 
Clearly, Dembling’s intent in using the terminology was to ensure that federal procurement 
regulation, never adversely impacted the execution of NASA’s mission. Additionally, 
NASA viewed SAA’s as a partnership in which they would provide many of the resources 
needed to successfully conduct R&D and prototyping capability (NASA, 20104). For 
example, in 1962 NASA used OTA to constructed creative agreements with AT&T in 
support of the first active satellite launch, TELSTAR I (Granath, 2012). The agreement 
was arranged on a reimbursable basis, meaning that AT&T would cover expenses related 
to the satellite’s initial prototype (Dunn, 2009). Over the past several decades, NASA has 
developed an organizational competency around crafting unique SAAs that would 
stimulate both scientific and commercial innovation.  
B. OTA’S ENTRANCE INTO THE DOD  
The mission of DARPA is to “serve as the central research and development 
organization of the Department of Defense with a primary responsibility to maintain U.S. 
technological superiority over potential adversaries” (Defense Advance Research 
Prototype Agency [DARPA], 2017). 
As opposed to NASA’s initial use of the statue, DARPA would work more closely 
with the Department of Defense on researching advance technologies and future concepts 
                                                 
7 There were other innovative initiatives and think tanks that emerged, for instance the RAND 
Corporation (Augier et al., 2015). 
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of operation (NASA, 1966). In collaboration with commercial companies and research 
institutions, DARPA has helped fund lofty technological breakthroughs such as the 
Internet, miniaturized GPS technologies, flat-screen displays, the Personal Assistant That 
Learns (PAL)–also known as Apple’s Siri, and a brain-computer interface making it 
possible to control limbs with the human brain (DARPA, 2017).  
Despite DARPA’s successes in advanced R&D, the organization’s expertise 
remained separate from the DoD’s core R&D operations performed by military program 
offices. Graham et al. (1988) discusses the impact of DARPA’s prototyping mission with 
DoD program offices: “it is expected that the shorter lines of management and the 
streamlined decision process within DARPA will enable these programs to progress more 
quickly” (Graham et al. 1988, p. IV–9). After more than thirty years of existence, DARPA 
received other transaction authority in 1989 through the creation of 10 U.S.C. § 2371. Upon 
its receipt of OTA, DARPA’s overall mission remained mostly unchanged, 
notwithstanding its ability to more readily impact R&D directly related weapon systems; 
to include advance research supporting dual-use technologies.  
DARPA’s use of OTA not only granted the military services access to advance 
technologies supporting existing weapon systems, but has also encouraged DoD leaders to 
consider other applications of OTA. The following section will discuss the use of OTA in 
the case of Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx). The focus of this organization, 
however, would not be existing DoD weapon systems, but rather the design and 
implementation of innovative business practices to provide the DoD with access to 
commercial technologies. See Figure 2 for DIUx’s major milestones and accomplishments. 
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Figure 2.  DIUx from 2015–2018. Source: DIUx (2017a). 
C. DIUX BACKGROUND 
In 2015, 57 years after the Space Act of 1958, the DoD continued its pursuit of new 
and innovative means to access commercial technologies with military applications. In 
2015, the Deputy Secretary of Defense released a memorandum detailing the creation of a 
“New Point of Presence” for the department in Silicon Valley (SV) (Work, 2015). 
According to the memo, The Defense Innovation Unit Experimental would seek to 
“increase the DoD’s communication with, knowledge of, and access to innovating, leading 
edge technologies from high-tech, start-up companies and entrepreneurs” (Work, 2015). In 
doing so, the organization sought to build rapport with organizations which had 
traditionally steered away from doing business with the government. The organization’s 
initial mission statement as provided within the memo seemed more fitting for a venture 
capitalist firm than a defense organization: “to strengthen existing relationships and build 
new ones; scout for breakthrough and emerging technologies; and function as a local 
interface node for the Department” (Work, 2015). In keeping with its intent to access some 
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of the world’s newest technologies, DIUx embarked upon a mission to established 
credibility and build new relationships within an international start-up hub. 
D. DIUX 2.0: LEADERSHIP SHIFT  
After a slow start in 2015, Secretary Carter announced an enhancement to the 
existing organization which would provide an overhaul in personnel and focus upon 
creating a mechanism that would facilitate transactions with small, start-up companies 
(DoD, 2016). In May 2016, utilizing special hiring authorities, OSD recruited an entirely 
new brand of leadership.8 This new team would consist of a hybrid of military reservists 
having extensive experience with venture-backed start-ups, commercial executives, and 
technical experts well-versed in the intersection between commercial innovations and 
national defense.9 
E. DIUX 2.0: DEFENSE SECRETARY ENDORSEMENT 
This new team set out to transform the organization’s approach to outreach and to 
further solidify its commitment to access innovative commercial technologies. By the end 
of the following month, the newly formed team oversaw the development of a new business 
process that would leverage its granted authority to construct creative agreements with 
potential companies. The Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO), primarily constructed by 
DIUx’s Pathways team, was a sleek and user-friendly mechanism for the DoD to become 
a non-dilutive investor in new and emerging technologies. The CSO provided a business 
arrangement that was both familiar and compatible to the start-up community of SV. By 
the end of the year, 12 agreements had been reached using the CSO process. The flexible 
design of the CSO was based on a newly granted authority within other transaction statues. 
                                                 
8 According to DIUx’s 2017 Annual Report, the organization used several authorities to access a 
broader range of talent such as the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), Presidential Innovation Fellows 
(PIF), Presidential Management Fellows (PMF), Special Government Employees (SGE), and the Highly 
Qualified Experts (HQE) authority. 
9 According to biography information, the new leadership background included a serial entrepreneur 
and Senior Director from Palo Alto Networks, former head of operations at Google X (Google’s R&D 
branch), and a former director of strategic planning at the National Security Council. Prior to DIUx 2.0, the 
organization’s leadership talent included, among other things, a former DARPA Program Manager and a 
senior member of the Naval Special Warfare community. 
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In 2016, 10 U.S.C. § 2371(b) gave the DoD the authority to enter into other transactions in 
order to carry out prototype projects relevant to enhancing the mission effectiveness of 
military personnel.10 This provision of authority laid the groundwork for DIUx to design 
the CSO in support of accessing commercial technology from small, nontraditional 
companies in SV and other innovative hubs throughout the U.S. 
With the CSO in place, the commercial community moved swiftly to participate, 
however it would take more time to convince DoD customers of its potential. The ultimate 
test would be winning the approval of a new Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis. Secretary 
Mattis, who served 44 years as a Marine, commented after his August, 2017 visit to DIUx’s 
SV office: “There is no doubt in my mind that DIUx will not only continue to exist, it will 
actually grow in its influence and its impact on the Department of Defense…And one of 
the ways that you make certain that you don’t have bad processes eat up good peoples’ 
ideas is you make certain that you remove the bad processes and organize for success” (J. 
Mattis, personal communication, August 10, 2017). 
F. ORGANIZED FOR SUCCESS AND INNOVATION: COLLABORATIVE 
WORKFLOW 
Infused with the endorsement of a new Secretary of Defense, DIUx set out to further 
strengthen its ability to facilitate a growing demand among its DoD customers and newly 
found industry partners. Armed with insight from tech talents and special authorities from 
Congress, DIUx endeavored to transform both its workflow and work environment. After 
multiple iterations of engagements with industry and project planning, DIUx slowly began 
to develop its own unique competencies using commercial software for collaborative 
workflow between its team members, DoD partners, and industry. Seamless video and 
chat-enable communication tools allows the organization to collaborate with team 
members and customers in real time. Since the collaboration software tools used at DIUx 
were purely commercial, many of the start-ups firms pitching their innovative solutions to 
DoD customers were able to quickly access DIUx project managers (PMs) to provide 
                                                 
10 10 U.S.C. 2371(b)  
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updates to projects or schedule pitch briefs. This not only sped up the project completion 
cycle-time, but removed barriers common to DoD and industry collaboration efforts. 
G. ORGANIZED FOR SUCCESS AND INNOVATION: WORK 
ENVIRONMENT 
We know from the strategy and management literature that it is not enough to have 
good people and resources in an organization; they must also be organized in ways that the 
resources, ideas, capabilities, and processes all have a strategic fit, within both the 
organization, and between the organization and its environment. In addition to the 
intellectual organization, the physical organization can be important, too (Augier et al., 
2015). Thus, DIUx 2.0 set out to enhance its work environment. Although projects could 
be managed remotely and often required travel, the headquarters office in Silicon Valley 
was intentionally designed for innovation, creative thought, and interdisciplinary 
collaboration. Almost no one maintains an office or office hours. Project managers 
especially must, somewhat, embody the work they do, as opposed to engaging with projects 
upon showing up to work. A six-month internship as a DIUx project manager quickly 
taught me that work was not simply a place I went, but what I did. Quite often, my work 
as PM would have to be conducted remotely and meetings were constantly managed among 
shifting time zones. But, while in the office, I was able to easily discuss major project 
milestones and upcoming due-outs with managing partners, portfolio leads, or other team 
members.  
The leadership of DIUx remained not only visible and accessible, but highly 
responsive. Various team and portfolio members talked openly and candidly over coffee, 
whiteboards, and Pop-Tart snacks, while others closed themselves off into a client-
customer room equipped with live video chat technology to discuss an upcoming project. 
The organization was uniquely flat, and as a result, projects supporting major DoD 
procurements were being conducted in record quantities and with speed. By the end of 
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2017, DIUx had executed more than 60 projects totaling over $185 million since its 
creation of the CSO in 2016 (DIUx, 2017a).11  
H. THE COMMERCIAL SOLUTIONS OPENING (CSO) 
Perhaps because the organization constantly sought new ways to understand and 
solve problems, the term process was not often used at DIUx. My understanding of its 
omission was the organization did not yet want to strictly prescribe a particular way in 
which projects ought to be executed. It really would depend on the nature of the project: 
the needs of the customer, the proposed timeline until completion, and how the project fit 
within the (customer) organization’s overall strategy. What was discussed quite often, 
however, was the idea of maintaining a culture of shared awareness. Although this was 
not explicitly defined for me during my tenure, what was demonstrated regarding this term 
was a savviness within the organization to communicate important details in a way that 
seemed both natural and interactive. By the term natural, I mean that there was not a 
meeting arranged each time something important needed to be done. Quite often, I would 
meet partners or executives in the hallway who would ask about projects or offer advice 
on dealing with stakeholders. Howsoever the term may be understood, it was clear that 
DIUx had a knack for furiously communicating project details across the organization. This 
may be contributed to the in-depth knowledge and expertise of its team members or the 
rigorous project awareness initiatives. In my observation, the core channel of 
communication and organizational chemistry came not only from the work environment, 
commercial software tools, or talented workforce; but from the workflow process.  
The CSO, authored by the DIUx Pathways team, is DIUx’s business process used 
to deliver innovation technologies to meet mission-critical needs of DoD’s warfighters. 
The process itself is not prescribed any particular acquisition regulation (and therefore it 
can remain adaptive and a tool to improve innovation). It is instead, a part of DIUx’s 
business model designed to swiftly access commercial technology, while operating along 
the parameters of existing regulations. The concept of DIUx’s CSO is captured in their 
                                                 
11 Total number of projects undertaken does not equal total number of prototype awards or follow-on 
production awards. 
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2016 CSO guidebook: “Fast, Flexible, and Collaborative: The Commercial Solutions 
Opening (CSO) and DIUx’s Approach to Other Transactions (OT) for Prototype Projects” 
(DIUx, 2016a; DIUx, 2016b). 
I. CSO COLLABORATION  
Pre-CSO activities begin with design-thinking and problem curation between the 
DoD customer and DIUx PMs, followed by initial market analysis to identify existing 
solutions within the innovative industrial base. Weekly briefs with portfolio members 
across the country facilitate shared awareness of each projects stage and priorities. The 
final determination to launch a new CSO is determined by an approval board consisting of 
managing partners, the PM, DIUx commercial executives, and portfolio leads. If the project 
is approved, the CSO initiates a competitive process with an average lead time of 90 days 
to award the initial prototype agreement. Successful prototypes can be successfully 
transition to a production agreement if the customer deems the prototype successful. The 
potential to transition prototype projects to production agreements could prove disruptive 
to acquisition and procurement processes following a more traditional pattern. The 
alternative however, is that DoD organizations requiring innovative means to access 
commercial technologies could leverage the lessons learned at DIUx to become better 
equipped for success and organized for innovation.12 
J. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a case regarding the DoD’s adoption of other transaction 
authority. Additionally, empirical observations were made regarding its use within DIUx 
as demonstrated within the CSO process. The following chapter will use the Five Stages 
Model for innovation adoption and other key themes from the literature review in order to 
provide an analysis of the case presented within this chapter. 
  
                                                 
12 Also see Williams, L.C. (2017) for senior officials’ perspective on DIUx’s impact on the overall 
defense acquisition system 
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IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
A. APPROACH TO ANALYSIS  
This chapter will analyze the DoD’s adoption of OTA as a means of constructing 
innovative agreements with commercial organizations. Key themes discovered during the 
literature review will be used to analyze the short cases and empirical information 
presented within the previous chapter The analysis will be conducted in two parts 
representative of key insights extracted from the literature review: 
(1) Communicating Innovation  
(2) Adopting Innovation 
Each part of the analysis will provide a brief overview of the theme, its relativity to 
the short cases, and supporting examples to further strengthen the analysis. 
B. COMMUNICATING INNOVATION 
Strategic communication of innovations as represented through relevant legislation 
and strategic-level guidance. 
1. Strategic-Level Guidance 
Strategic-level guidance for the creation of OTA was not explicitly mandated. The 
Eisenhower administration identified a capability gap and potential threat to national 
security. Although strategic-level guidance did not directly mandate the creation of OTA, 
those responsible for its creation understood the nature and intent of the guidance provided 
and were able to create a policy relevant to the needs identified by strategic-level leaders.  
2. Relevant Policy 
NASA was established by the Space Act of 1958 in response to the launch of 
Sputnik I and to develop competitive space launch and exploration capabilities. Strategic-
level concerns surrounding the launch of Sputnik I not only drove the creation of the Space 
Act, but became the agenda-setting mechanism for the creation and use of OTA; and 
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eventually the federal statue applicable to DoD in 1989. OTA was initially created to 
support policy specifically relevant to NASA’s strategic-level mission. 
3. Group and Interpersonal Communication within Organizations  
The initial procurement training conducted at NASA in 1961 was facilitated by the 
Army whom had transferred a large part of the DoD’s missile programs to the new 
administration. It is not clear that this training included the use of OTA; however, what can 
be extrapolated is that the training being provided was extremely helpful in assisting 
NASA’s management of DoD programs (NASA, 1966). NASA’s initial use of OTA 
focused not on the DoD programs of which it had inherited, but rather on its collaboration 
with commercial organizations; such as in the development of TELSTAR I.  
Of note, however, is DoD’s possible exposure to OTA during the period between 
1958 and 1989. Since, no strategic or policy-level initiatives explicitly propagated OTA’s 
use within DoD between this time period, it is likely that the knowledge surrounding the 
use of this authority was transferred through individuals, such as Richard Dunn, who 
transferred from NASA to DARPA in 1987 two years prior to DoD’s initial authorization 
to use OTA in support of advance research (“Strategic Institute,” n.d.). 
Strategic and organizational level communication was initiated with NASA and 
eventually transferred to the DoD in 1989. Although authority to use OTA was approved 
by congress, the DoD had not yet integrated the framework for its use within its existing 
programs and business practices. Using the Five Stages Model for innovation adoption, the 
following section will analyze the DoD’s process of integrating OTA within DARPA and 
subsequently DIUx. 
C. ADOPTING INNOVATION 
The Five Stages Model will be used to help provide an analysis of the DoD’s 
adoption of OTA.13  As previously stated, analyzing the adoption of innovations within 
                                                 
13 Among other analytical models are the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) 
analysis; Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal (PESTEL) analysis; and 
Porter’s Five Forces. However, the Five Stages Model was specifically designed to analyze an organization 
process of adopting innovations. 
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organizations is not an exact science, however its undertaking has the potential to reap 
rewards not realized if avoided. Rogers (2003) briefly addresses the challenges of 
analyzing innovation at the organizational level:  
The general assumption of research on innovation in organizations is that 
organizational variables act on the innovation behavior in a manner over 
and above that of the aggregate of individual members of the organization. 
Thus, the organizational context of these innovation process studies adds a 
kind of intellectual ‘supercharger’ to the analysis. (Rogers, 2003, p. 418) 
As presented within the literature review, the Five Stages model discusses two 
phases within the process of innovation adoption: 1) initiation (agenda-setting and 
matching) and 2) implementation (redefining/restructuring, clarifying, and routinizing) 
(Rogers, 2003). The Five Stage model will be applied to the integration of OTA within 
DoD organizations. OTA has been used sparingly across the DoD; however, the three 
organizations presented within the case have played a significant role in the creation of 
OTA and its integration into DoD organizations. This analysis will cover each phases as 
well as I will use the two phases of analysis to better understand the process of integrating 
OTA within the DoD. This analysis will not cover each federal agency or DoD 
organizations which have used OTA, but rather it will cover those organizations that will 
pivotal in the creation of OTA as well as its entrance into the DoD. Additionally, the 
analysis will analyze DIUx as a DoD organization currently using OTA in its most recent 
statutory form: 10 U.S.C. 2371(b).  
The initiation phase will be used to explain the process of adopting OTA as a policy 
mechanism to integrate commercial business practices at both NASA and DARPA.14The 
phase will cover the agenda-setting and matching stages within these organizations. The 
second phase analyzes DIUx’s implementation of OTA. The specific stages of this phase 
are redefining/restructuring, clarifying, and routinizing. Although a brief analysis of the 
initiation phase is provided, I assumed the analysis of DIUx’s implementation of OTA to 
be a more relevant undertaking. These three reasons support my assumption: 1) During my 
                                                 
14 Although NASA is a civilian agency, research on the organization shows that several defense 
programs, including some being led by ARPA, were transferred to the organization during the initial years 
of their existence (NASA, 1966). 
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short tenure at the organization, we were heavily focused on the three stages involved in 
implementation: redefining/restructuring, clarifying, and routinizing. During my first day 
as an official Xer,15 the DIUx team celebrated its first-ever production OT16 and later found 
itself undergoing further cycles of restructuring, clarifying, and routinizing in order to 
integrate business practices that would support production OTs. 2) The underlying policy 
which reinforces the DIUx business model, OTA, has undergone intense agenda-setting 
and matching activities since its origins in 1958. OTAs are extremely mature in the 
initiation phase activities as will be demonstrated in the brief analysis of NASA and 
DARPA. 3) Organizations wishing to adopt certain practices or lessons learned will likely 
find it critical to understand and apply the stages within the second phase. Collaboration 
within DoD customers during projects revealed a point of friction which is central to the 
theme of this thesis: other DoD organizations seeking to collaborate on a DIUx project 
could easily become frustrated during attempts to implement innovative business practices 
within their organizations. Such business practices were central to the effective execution 
of OTA-related projects. 
1. Agenda-Setting Analysis 
As previously discussed, agenda-setting is the way which organizations prioritize 
problems, needs, and issues. Central to the prioritization of problems is the ability to 
identify performance gaps (Rogers, 2003). Rogers states that performance gaps can “trigger 
the innovative process” (Rogers, 2003, p. 422). As the most important problems within the 
organization are being identified, its members also begin to locate potential innovation 
solutions. During the onset of the Cold War, the U.S. proposed that high priority be placed 
on space launch capabilities requiring intense R&D activity. In order to achieve this high-
level of intensity and provide solutions at a speed relevant to the U.S. agenda, the 
Eisenhower administration endorse the establishment of NASA (NASA, 1966). The 
founding documents of the organization included a flexible mechanism to carry out 
                                                 
15 A term of endearment among members of the organization; predominantly espoused by a few of its 
managing partners.  
16 This was the first production OT awarded in the history of the DoD (DIUx, 2017b). 
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transactions with industry; simply termed other transactions. NASA’s first General 
Counsel and the author of the Space Act, Paul G. Dembling, references the problem the 
new organization was attempting to solve and the innovative solution he identified: 
I wanted to assure that the organization met any contingency that might 
arise, and so I added the language for “other transactions.” The Space Act, 
for the first time, authorized an agency, NASA, to enter into “other 
transactions.” This authority is without limitation. Since such a transaction 
is not a procurement agreement, it is not subject to the laws, regulations, 
and other requirements applicable to contracts, leases, cooperative 
agreements. It is this flexibility which provides authority to structure 
agreements in accordance with standard business practices. (Dembling, 
2008, p. 211) 
NASA’s launched the first active satellite using OTA. This particular agreement 
was structured on a reimbursable cost-basis for the design of AT&Ts TELSTAR I. In order 
for OTA to begin the integration process within DoD however, it would have to be matched 
to the specific needs of that particular organization.  
2. Matching Analysis 
According to Rogers (2003), the matching stage involves two key activities: fitting 
and testing. This portion of the analysis will assess DoD’s fitting and testing activities 
surrounding its use of OTA within DARPA. I have divided the analysis into two sections: 
a) properly fitting OTA within DoD programs and b) testing OTA within DoD existing 
programs and processes 
a. Properly Fitting OTA within DoD Programs 
Although OTA had been used by NASA since 1958, it was not yet integrated into 
the DoD until 1989. The process of integrating OTA began in an initial provision of the 
authority to DARPA.17 Although other agencies have received and used this authority,18 
                                                 
17 Initial authority from Pub. L. No. 101-189 § 251 
18 These agencies include Department of Energy (DOE), Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy 
(ARPA-E), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), National Institutes of Health (NIH), 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA), Department of Transportation (DOT), and Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) (Neumann, 2016)  
 38 
its initial integration within DoD is mainly results from the relationship between NASA 
and DARPA. Upon leaving his post at NASA, Richard Dunn became the first General 
Counsel of DARPA in 1987 (“Strategic Institute,” 2018). Dunn further explains the 
connection between the two agencies: “One problem NASA faced (or created) was concern 
that SAAs19 could provide goods and services to a partner but not funding…That reticence 
was eventually overcome when DARPA began using funded OTs under Section 2371 
(1989)” (Strategic Institute for Innovation in Government Contracting, 2018, p. 14).20 The 
DoD’s OT authority, administered through DARPA, would be heavily focused on 
enhancing the R&D process within DoD’s existing program offices (Graham et al., 1988; 
Dunn, 1996).  
b. Testing OTA within DoD Existing Programs and Processes 
Remember the quote about DARPA being able to now be a part of transitioning 
from milestone I to II (Graham et al., 1988). According to Rogers (2003), matching 
involves anticipating the benefits, and the problems, that the innovation will encounter 
when it is implemented. The organization’s decision-makers may conclude that the 
innovation is mismatched with the problem” (p. 423). The initial authority received by 
DARPA to use OTA was accompanied by sunset provisions. This provided DoD leadership 
an opportunity to assess the feasibility of OTA as it was applied in conjunction with 
existing DoD programs. Assessing the feasibility of a new innovation is core to the 
matching stage. It allows the organization to closely assess the hypothetical performance 
of the innovation’s use in conjunction with existing business processes and programs. 
DARPA’s preliminary use of OTA, as applied to DoD’s weapon system programs, 
provided the testing-grounds for its future use within other DoD organizations. Overtime, 
these temporary provisions have become permanent within DoD, potentially signaling their 
transition from the matching stage to the redefining/restructuring stage.21 For these reasons, 
                                                 
19 Space Act Agreements (SAAs). 
20  See Dunn (1996), for a several changes made to the original statute. 
21 See Neumann (2016) for a more detailed description of agencies using OTA under provisional 
authorities such as DOE and DHS; since 2005 and 2002, respectively. 
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the matching stage is central to an innovation’s progress within the adopting organization; 
and its completion marks a transition from the initiation phase to the implementation phase. 
According to Figure 3, no significant changes have been made to the Space Act 
since the late 1980s. Figure 4, however, depicts an influx of legislative matching activities 
surrounding DARPA’s § 2371 authority during that same period.  
 
Figure 3.  OTA Matching Activity, 1958–2018. Source: Pub. L. No. 85–
568  
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Figure 4. OTA Matching Activity, 1989–2018. Source: 10 U.S.C. § 
2371 
3. Redefining/Restructuring Analysis
 The redefining/restructuring stage within organizations marks a clear point of 
departure from the initiation of an innovation to a focus on implementing the innovation 
(Rogers, 2003). Again, focusing upon the implementation steps (redefining/restructuring, 
clarifying, and routinizing) within DIUx does not imply that NASA or DARPA did not 
reach a successful state of implementing this particular innovation. In fact, the declined use 
of OTA within DoD set the stage for a new and meaningful alternative use, as demonstrated 
within DIUx. Dunn (2018) describes the lagging implementation of OTA within DoD: 
Despite the numerous success and demonstrations of better, faster, and 
cheaper approaches to Defense acquisition, use of these authorities dropped 
off dramatically for over ten years. Only recently has DODs need for speed 
and innovation in fielding new capabilities seen a partial resurgence in their 
use. Congress has repeatedly called for more innovation in defense 
acquisition and the previous Secretary of Defense created the Defense 
Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) to try to bridge the gap between 
innovative private sector companies and needed defense capabilities. (p. 15) 
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DIUx’s approach to acquisitions and innovation is definitively experimental. The 
design of the CSO allows for a considerable period for DoD customers to test innovations 
in the form of prototype projects. If the innovation provided by a commercial company, 
matches the need of the DoD customer, DIUx will seek to move on to the next stage of 
adopting the innovation: redefining and restructuring.  
4. Clarifying Analysis 
Clarifying activities are demonstrated by deliberate attempts to address potential 
concerns surrounding the innovation. Clarifying activities undergone by the organizations 
being analyzed, sometimes took the form of stakeholder awareness initiatives, during 
which interested parties could learn more about how the innovation might potentially 
enhance or modify the stakeholder’s future operations and business processes. In other 
cases, clarifying activities take the form of developing whitepapers, guidebooks, and other 
forms of communication in order to disseminate basic knowledge about the details of an 
innovation. For example, the Grant and Agreement Regulations of 2011 serves as guidance 
for some R&D projects, while the Other Transactions Guide for Prototype Projects (2002, 
2017) serves as guidance for prototype projects.  
In the case of DIUx, they appeared to take a more aggressive stance to internally 
routinize the CSO process with the organization, prior to conducting intense clarifying 
activities. After developing a routinized process, the organization focused more on 
clarifying the CSO to a broader DoD community.22  
5. Routinizing Analysis 
According to Rogers (2003), “Routinizing occurs when an innovation has become 
incorporated into the regular activities of the organization and has lost its separate identity. 
At that point, the innovation process is completed” (pp. 428–429). OTA’s long-term use 
                                                 
22 During my time as a DIUx PM, partnering with DoD customers during the problem curation phase 
of a project not only involved identifying potential innovative solutions, but spending time clarifying the 
business process surrounding OTA. In this way, I was able to integrate clarifying activities within 
individual projects (and whenever else needed), while the organization as a whole continue honing 
routinization activities to further strengthen the CSO’s implementation. Forgoing clarifying actions 
completely, could potentially frustrate DoD customers who were more accustomed to mainstream 
approaches to government procurement 
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within NASA and DARPA immediately hint that innovative practices surrounding the 
authority has become fairly routinized within both organizations. However, a decline in 
OTA usage within DoD could signaled that the authority has not completely lost its identity 
as a rather novel concept within DoD acquisitions. Additionally, 10 U.S.C. 2371(b) is no 
no longer provisional, thus signaling a stronger posture towards the institutionalization of 
OTA. The institutionalization of OTA can be partially seen in its transition from a 
provisional or sunset authority to a permanent statue. 
Figure 5 provides strong indication that NASA has reached the routinizing stage of 
OTA usage.23 The finality of its usage within NASA defends its position within the 
routinization stage. According to Neumann (2016), 
NASA cannot use an other transaction agreement for any activity that could 
be completed using a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement. Moreover, 
any project which primarily benefits NASA or is intended to meet a NASA 
need must be performed using a contract rather than an other transaction 
agreement (p. 21).24 
                                                 
23 See Neumann (2016). 
24 See Neumann (2016) for details surround NASA’s use of OTA. One of the primary uses is rental and 
use of NASA’s facilities on a reimbursable basis (Neumann, 2016). 
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Figure 5.  NASA and DoD OTA Activity. Source: Neumann (2016). 
NASA’s highly frequent use of OTA demonstrates its own particular use of the 
authority, which is not congruent with its use within DoD. Whereas NASA has traditionally 
used OTA as a means to provide commercial organizations with the facilities need to 
perform space-related R&D, the DoD has used the authority to enable joint ventures 
between small, nontraditional companies and DoD as well as to promote novel applications 
of commercial technologies for defense purposes. 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
The purpose of this analysis was to evaluate the DoD’s adoption of other 
transactions authority. Specific attention was not only given to the adoption process, but 
the DoD’s ability to adequately communicate the innovation to those who would be 
responsible for its initiation and implementation. Clear strategic-level initiatives provided 
the initial guidance for including terminology aimed at the adoption of innovative 
commercial business practices by NASA. Eventually, the innovation was initiated within 
DoD in 1989 for the purpose of conducting advance research. Since that time, the authority 
has been re-invented on several occasions in order to meet the expectations and needs of 
DoD’s mission. Overall, the implementation of OTA is not primarily about understanding 
policy, contracting, or even innovation. It is primarily an effort of understanding human 
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interactions and how members of an organization relate to one another. The following 
chapter will identify the key findings of this analysis and provide recommendations, 
lessons learned, and potential areas of future research. 
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V. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter utilizes lessons from both the literature review and case analysis to 
provide findings and recommendations in support of DoD organizations attempting to more 
effectively organization for innovation. The findings and recommendations additionally 
reflect the key themes identified in both the literature review and case analysis. 
A. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
a. Finding 1:
In reference to the analysis provided in Chapter IV, organizations whom have the 
ability and capacity to effectively adopt innovations, avoid the temptation to do so in 
situations under conditions wherein the innovation is not aligned with its mission or a 
specified problem identified within the organization.  
b. Recommendation 1:
Innovations pursued within DoD organizations should be aligned with the mission 
of the organization and a specified problem or capability gap (avoid adopting innovations- 
on-the-loose).  
c. Finding 2:
In reference to the analysis provided in Chapter IV, innovations require a period of 
low-visibility fitting and testing.  
d. Recommendation 2:
Prior to reaching the clarifying stage, organizations should conduct seek to properly 
test and fit the innovation within real-time programs and day-to-day operations (i.e., 
prototyping). These efforts will enable the organization and its leaders to facilitate 
subsequent clarifying questions and questions regarding the innovations impact upon the 
status quo. Many innovations fail due to the lack of clarity surrounding the innovation, as 
opposed to performance issues. Clarifying the purpose of the innovation will help others 
within the organization contribute to its implementation. 
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e. Finding 3:  
In reference to the analysis provided in Chapter IV, providing opportunities to re-
invent/redefine the innovation and restructure the adopting organization, allows both the 
innovation and the organization to reap the maximum benefits of the innovation adoption 
process. 
f. Recommendation 3:  
Allow organizational members impacted by the innovation to engage in re-
inventing and redefining of the innovation. Re-inventing and redefining of innovations is 
a normal part of the adoption process and ought to be for the purpose of aligning the 
innovation more closely with the organization’s given mission. Likewise, consideration 
ought to be given as to how the innovation might perform more effectively if the structure 
or workflow of the organization is altered.  
g. Finding 4: 
As demonstrated within the Chapter III cases, when provided with strategic-level 
guidance, innovative organizations aggressively assume innovativeness. They do not 
always wait for explicit instructions or guidance to innovate, but rather assume innovation 
as an implicit directive. 
h. Recommendation 4: 
Many of the ideas and practices espoused by the organizations within the case 
study, demonstrated a bias for innovation as opposed to adopting innovations as result of 
directives. Although directives and other strategic-level communications provide the basis 
of an organization’s mission and objectives, innovation must be assumed in how those 
objectives are carried out. For example, DIUx’s CSO was designed to comply with the 
legislative requirements of 10 U.S.C. §2371(b), however it assumed an innovative 
approach quite different from other institutions which have used the same authority.  
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i. Finding 5:  
Innovative talent need not always be recruited, but can be harnessed within the 
organization. For example, the DIUx workflow and organizational capacity to integrate 
commercial business practices further harnessed my innovative thinking and overall 
approach to project management. 
j. Recommendation 5: 
In addition to identifying characteristics which cause individuals to behave and 
think innovatively, DoD can identify values which drive innovation at the organizational-
level. The organizations which can be observed exists within, but also beyond the 
commercial sector. Organizations such as RAND Corporation, DARPA, NASA, and DIUx 
provide past and present examples of innovations within organization. Figure 6 provides a 
brief comparison of values espoused by the RAND Corporation during the 1940s and 50s 
and those of DIUx. 
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Outlier Values RAND DIUx 
Mission Perspective  Enhancing decision-
makers 
Accelerates commercial 
innovation to the warfighter 




PMs integrate with DoD 




Collaboration is designed around 
key decisions within major 
project workflow 
Overarching 
Organizational Culture  
Outside-the-box-
thinking and a 
tolerance for 
independent ideas 
Rapid innovation and project 
execution; non-dilutive venture 
capital; technology start-up 
 
Figure 6.  Comparative Outlier Values. Adapted from Augier et al. 
(2015) and DIUx (2107). 
B. SUMMARY 
This research was designed to extend the discussion regarding the DoD’s 
integration of innovations at the organizational-level. During the course of research, I 
addressed key issues surround the process of adoption, including several nuances 
associated with this process. The overall objective of this research was to identify how the 
adoption of innovative concepts, methodologies, and technologies be better understood and 
leveraged within DoD organizations. Chapter I introduced the concept of innovation 
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adoption and further described innovation within context of national defense. Chapter II 
provided a review of literature surrounding the topic of innovation adoption and the 
nuances associated with its conduct within DoD and other organizations. Additionally, 
Chapter II introduced the Five Stages Model for innovation adoption within organizations. 
Chapter III presented short cases on the DoD’s adoption of other transaction authority as a 
means to construct innovative purchase agreements. The organizations covered within the 
cases represent those pivotal in the DoD adoption and implementation of OTA. Chapter IV 
provided an analysis of the cases presented within Chapter III using key themes extracted 
from the literature review. Chapter V identifies key findings and recommendations 
stemming from the analysis. 
Although the process of adopting innovations will likely differ across 
organizations, there does exist a broad-level of applicable lessons learned from 
organizational successes and failures. In the final sections of this chapter, I will provide 
lessons learned as a result of my research and offer recommendations for future research.  
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
Adopting innovations within any organization is undoubtedly a complex endeavor 
and difficult to achieve; however, the literature surrounding the topic affirms that DoD 
organizations possess a few unrealized advantages within the adoption process. For 
instance, several DoD organizations are accustomed to identifying capability gaps within 
their organizations. As identified in the previous chapters and highlighted within the 
recommendations, innovation adoption is often initiated by the identification of an 
organization’s problems or capability gaps. These problems and gaps represent potential 
opportunities for organizations to initiate innovative solutions. Successful adoptions of 
innovation are often characterized by the ability to link problems and capability gaps with 
the innovation. Next, DoD organizations are accustomed to mission-focused operations. 
This particular characteristic helps drive the agenda-setting process, enabling organizations 
to quickly identify what problems to prioritize. Finally, DoD organizations face an ever-
changing enemy and operational landscape. Because of this, there continues to exist and 
abundance of opportunities to adopt new ideas, methods, and technologies.  
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D. FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH 
Future areas of study may include the application of the Five Stages Model to other 
innovation adoption cases within DoD organizations. At this present time, the adoption of 
technologies, operating concepts, and policy distinctly related to the various domains of 
warfare would provide an interesting avenue of approach to further apply the model. 
Additionally, as the DoD commissions more organizations with innovation-related 
missions, the model can be used to further strengthen the adoption process within these 
organizations. Finally, as DoD’s learning institutions play a significant role in officer 
development, education, and training, I suggest that the subject of innovation–especially 
as it relates to innovative acquisition, contracting, and agreement mechanisms–be included 
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